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I. THE LAW OF SPORTS
Amateur and professional sports pervade American society to a
remarkable extent. Even though sports have always been part of
America's heritage, the last thirty years have seen an unprecedented
saturation of sports in America's social, political, and economic fiber.
From a social perspective it has been noted, with the risk of over-
statement, that
[s]port permeates any number of levels of contemporary society and
it touches upon and deeply influences such disparate elements as sta-
tus, race relations, business life, automotive design, clothing styles,
the concept of the hero, language, and ethical values. For better or
worse, it gives form and substance to much in American life.'
The financial impact of sports of the seventies is staggering in
comparison to the sports economics of thirty years ago. The effect of
sports on local communities is illustrated by such massive, publicly
funded projects as the construction of the New Orleans Superdome at a
cost of $163.5 million, the renovation of Yankee Stadium at a cost of
$100 million, and the $60 million investment in a new stadium that
Seattle, Washington made in order to attract a professional football
team.2 The overall profitability of sports has had its impact on athletes
as well, as indicated by the salaries of such stars as Bill Walton, who is
reputed to earn over $800,000 per year.3 Indeed, sports economics has
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2. H.R. REP. No. 1786, supra note 1, at 9, 202, 212.
3. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1979, § III, at 7, col. 1.
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affected such a wide spectrum of American society that Ralph Nader
has taken a consumer interest in the matter, suggesting the need for a
fans' union.4
Sports have even begun to affect the political process. For exam-
ple, several sports personalities have successfully sought political of-
fice.5 More importantly, Congress is devoting an increasing amount of
time to various sports-related issues, including television blackouts of
sporting events, athlete immigration, federal tax treatment of sports
matters, and the need for congressional oversight of intercollegiate ath-
letics. 6
Given the considerable influence of sports on these aspects of
American life, it was inevitable that the legal system would be called
upon to resolve conflicts between affected participants. It is therefore
not surprising that in the last thirty years, and especially in the last
decade, a great number of sports-related problems have arisen in the
nation's courts and legislative bodies.
The Law of Sports is an attempt to collect and analyze the law that
has developed in the field of sports. It covers both professional and
amateur athletics, and ranges from the less publicized aspects of federal
taxation in the sports context to the highly visible areas of contracts,
antitrust, torts, and public regulation as they have developed in the
sports arena. The book not only provides a comprehensive compilation
of the relevant, multifaceted case law, but in many areas-particularly
contracts, antitrust, and amateur athletics-it provides in-depth analy-
ses of the issues presently affecting the development of the law of
sports.
It is difficult to evaluate a multi-authored book covering an area as
diverse as sports law. Not surprisingly, enterprises of this type often
result in works of uneven quality, unsuited for the traditional purposes
of a legal treatise, and inappropriately chosen as the subject of critical
review. Furthermore, it is particularly difficult to assess the analytical
quality of a work that deals with such a new area of the law. The Law
of Sports is surely a work that breaks new ground in an area of juris-
4. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1977, § D, at 17, col. 1. Nader chastises club owners, stating:
The arrogance of the owners and their lack of sensitivity toward their fans is accelerat-
ing. They never ask the fans what they think of the policies and rules these owners set.
And the fans have a right to know the full costs they are paying, as taxpayers, for the
muncipal [sic] stadiums most of them can't get into, even if they could afford a ticket.
Id.
5. E.g., U.S. Representative Jack F. Kemp from New York, former star quarterback for the
Buffalo Bills, and U.S. Senator Bill Bradley from New Jersey, former star forward for the New
York Knicks.
6. H.R. REP. No. 1786, supra note 1, at 4-7.
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prudence that until recently has not prompted serious legal analysis.
Despite these qualifications, it can be safely noted that no previous
work in the area of sports law matches this book in the breadth of its
coverage and the comprehensiveness of its analyses. The authors have
successfully overcome the tendency of many writers in the sports law
field to publish a finished product more closely resembling a sophisti-
cated newspaper sports story than a piece of legal scholarship. The
authors have provided an exhaustively researched work generally re-
flecting both depth of inquiry and accuracy of insight. The book reme-
dies the deficiencies of previous works in the area by providing a
thorough and balanced view of sports law. Further, the book is ex-
tremely readable. It is not an overstatement to note that the book sig-
nals the coming of age of the field of sports law.
As noted above, The Law of Sorts not only serves as a valuable
tool for research but also offers significant new perspectives in the field
of sports law. This is especially true in Chapters 3 and 4, covering con-
tractual relationships in professional sports, and Chapter 5, dealing
with antitrust issues.7 No other work in this field has detailed and ana-
lyzed in such a thorough fashion the fundamental contract law princi-
ples as they apply to sports law. The range of issues covered, from the
basic principles of contract formation to arbitration, and the exhaustive
nature of their coverage are in the best tradition of scholarly legal writ-
ing. This analysis, together with the supplements planned for the fu-
ture, should provide the basis for better reasoned case law in this area.
More importantly, it should provide participants in the sports law
arena with the guiding principles needed for avoidance of expensive
and time consuming litigation. It is a book for lawyers, judges, man-
agement, players, and, perhaps, even the avid, inquisitive sports fan
trying to make some sense out of today's law-laden newspaper sports
pages.
Despite its quality research and readable style, the book is not
without its limitations. Any book that breaks new ground in a rela-
tively new area of jurisprudence is bound to have faults. For example,
the book covers some areas of questionable relevance. This is particu-
larly the case in the treatment of subject matter insignificantly affected
by the sports context in which it arises. The authors, while aware of
this pitfall and noting it in their preface, nevertheless allow themselves
to fall prey to it. For example, Chapter 8, entitled "Liability for Inju-
ries in Sports Activities," deals with some areas of the law that do not
7. See text accompanying notes 10-52 infra for a more detailed discussion of the antitrust
issues treated in this book.
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seem to warrant special treatment because of the sports context.8 A
more serious deficiency is that the quality of the legal analysis is une-
ven, with some areas such as tax receiving less valuable treatment than
the areas of contracts and antitrust.
The remaining portion of this review will focus on parts of the
antitrust sections of The Law of Sports.9 In recent years, sports anti-
trust matters have been the subject of extensive legal activity, which has
been extremely important in shaping the development and growth of
professional sports leagues. Not surprisingly, approximately 300 pages,
roughly one-third of The Law of Sports, are devoted to coverage of this
area. Thus, sports antitrust matters provide a representative sampling
of the diverse questions that have appeared in the sports law context,
and the treatment the area receives from the authors is indicative of the
overall quality of this work.
II. ANTITRUST IN THE LAW OF SPORTS
A'. The Baseball Exemption.
Any discussion of antitrust in the field of sports law must begin
with the controversial baseball antitrust exemption and this is where
Weistart and Lowell begin.' 0 The United States Supreme Court, dur-
ing the last sixty years, has held on three separate occasions that base-
ball is exempt from the reach of federal antitrust laws." Legal
commentary dealing with these decisions has been extensive, and con-
siderable criticism of the exemption exists.' 2 Of particular critical in-
terest has been Flood v. Kuhn,13 the Supreme Court's latest decision
upholding the exemption. This case restates the rationale of an earlier
decision' 4 that Congress, by failing to remove the baseball exemption,
tacitly approved the first antitrust case that established the exemption.' 5
Whether the rationales of these decisions are valid and whether as a
matter of policy Congress should permit this exemption to stand, the
fact remains that baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws. From an
institutional perspective, the history of this exemption is a case study of
8. See, e.g., THE LAW OF SPORTS §§ 8.04, .08.
9. Id. §§ 5.01-.12.
10. Id. § 5.02.
11. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
12. See authorities cited in THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.02, at 480-82 & n.17.
13. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
14. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
15. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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the constraints that Congress and the federal courts are subject to in
reversing an obviously erroneous policy.
The authors next discuss the scope of the baseball exemption, con-
cluding that the exemption has been more narrowly construed than
originally expected. They base this conclusion on two observations.
First, and most importantly, they point out that the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the exemption does not extend to other sports.' 6
Thus, other professional sports leagues, after some hesitancy, have had
to adjust their activities to conform with the antitrust laws. Second,
they note that professional baseball players, the principal actors bear-
ing the economic burden of the exemption, have been able to obtain
many of the benefits attained by players in other sports leagues falling
under the protection of antitrust laws. This has occurred through sev-
eral means. Baseball's reserve clause has been interpreted, through the
process of mandatory arbitration, to be limited to a specific number of
years.17 Accordingly, baseball players have been able to complete their
contracts and bargain for their services with other league teams without
the perpetual restraint sought by the team owners. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, baseball management has come under congressional pres-
sure either to amend some of the more oppressive player restraint
practices or to face the possibility of having its antitrust exemption re-
moved.' 8 This pressure has increased in light of the responses of other
sports leagues to changes in their player restraint systems. Finally, the
baseball antitrust exemption may be limited to "the essential aspects of
the league's sports function."' 9 The parameters of this limitation, if
indeed a limitation exists, remain to be defined by the courts. How-
ever, it appears that the further league restraints wander from activities
directly required to bring the league's product-baseball games-to the
public, the greater the possibility that the courts will remove the ex-
emption.
B. Player Restraint Litigation.
As was perhaps apparent from the discussion above, the largest
body of law in the sports antitrust field is found in the area of player
restraint litigation.20 Player restraints are methods used by sports
league managers to prohibit or restrict player movement both inside
and outside their sports league. These restraints commonly take the
16. THE LAW OF SPoRTS § 5.02b.
17. Id. § 5.03, at 516-24.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 1786, supra note 1, at 4; 65 A.B.A.J. 537 (1979).
19. THE LAW OF SPoRTs § 5.02, at 498.
20. Id. § 5.03, at 500.
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form of reserve or option clauses, player draft systems, and the prohibi-
tion of intra-league player "tampering." These basic player restraints
vary in form among the different sports leagues. The leagues justify
them primarily on the grounds of the need to maintain a competitive
balance between league teams and the need to retain the image of
sports leagues as fair and honestly competitive.
1. The Labor Exemption. The authors correctly identify the "la-
bor law exemption" to the antitrust laws as the threshold issue in the
player restraint area.2' This exemption is a judicial reconciliation of
federal labor and antitrust laws whereby certain types of agreements
reached between labor and management during the course of collective
bargaining are exempt from the reach of the federal antitrust laws.
Since sports management and player unions have been involved in col-
lective bargaining in all the major sports leagues in the recent past, the
labor exemption becomes a matter of crucial concern in the sports
arena. While this exemption is presently the subject of much interest in
sports law, it was not until 1971 that the issue began to surface in legal
literature.22 Before that time neither management nor players had seri-
ously considered the availability and consequences of the labor exemp-
tion.
While the relevance of the labor exemption to sports is no longer
in doubt, the authors indicate that the role it will eventually play re-
mains uncertain. They advance two reasons for this doubt. First, the
doctrinal foundation of the exemption has not been well defined by the
Supreme Court.23 Second, the commercial setting of the sports indus-
try is in many ways different from the traditional commercial setting
within which the labor exemption was developed.24 A notable example
of this contrast is that in the area of professional sports, management is
the party seeking the shield of the exemption rather than a labor group.
These two reasons for uncertainty have combined to cause the few
courts that have analyzed the labor exemption in the sports context to
have great difficulty in applying the inadequately defined exemption to
the nontraditional commercial realities of the sports world. Not sur-
prisingly, this has led to significant confusion in the labor exemption
cases so far decided in the sports setting.
In analyzing this area, the authors hypothesize a situation in which
21. Id. § 5.04, at 524.
22. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principies and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Super-
starsin Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971). This appears to be the first legal commentary on the labor
law exemption in the professional sports context.




management and players have in good faith negotiated a player re-
straint that adequately balances the interests of both players and man-
agement. The authors then extensively review the Supreme Court
cases interpreting the labor exemption and conclude that they are of
questionable precedential value in the situation posited. 25 This limita-
tion results largely from the predominant factual pattern of these cases:
usually the agreement between the parties to the collective bargaining
results in the exertion of economic influence upon parties outside the
bargaining process. 26 In sharp contrast, the question of economic influ-
ence in the player restraint situation is directed toward one of the par-
ties to the collective bargaining agreement, the player. The authors
buttress their argument that it is inappropriate to use the antitrust laws
to regulate sports intramarket employment practices that have no dis-
cernable impact on outside markets by reference to Meat Cutters Local
189 v. Jewel Tea Co.27 In that case the Supreme Court suggested that a
balancing approach should be used to decide the validity of a collective
bargaining agreement affecting outside market conditions. The factors
to be weighed are the injury to business competition and the signifi-
cance and immediacy of the labor group's concern with the particular
restriction.28 In so holding, the Court implied that the antitrust laws
are not relevant to agreements relating solely to conditions of employ-
ment that do not affect any outside market.
The authors use this analysis as their springboard to suggest that
the validity of collectively bargained player restraints should not be
subject to antitrust analysis, but rather should be evaluated in accord-
ance with labor law principles. 29 In contrast to the uncertainty posed
by attempting to apply the labor law antitrust exemption to the authors'
hypothetical situation, application of labor law principles supports the
conclusion that the hypothetically fair bargaining agreement between
players and management should be upheld.30 The determinant issue
becomes whether an individual player should be allowed to object,
once the union negotiates for all the players, that the collective agree-
ment restrains his capacity to market his services. The applicable prin-
ciples include mandatory collective bargaining for terms and
conditions of employment, freedom of contract, and, since the collec-
tive bargaining relationship is governed by the will of the majority, the
25. Id. § 5.04b.
26. Id. § 5.04, at 526.
27. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
28. THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.05, at 556.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 5.05f-h.
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individual's inability to independently contract with his employer.3 1
These principles support the conclusion that an individual player
should not be permitted to use the antitrust laws to invalidate agree-
ments between management and labor not affecting an outside market.
Some of the case law in the sports area has held, however, that the
labor exemption is not available in the player restraint context.3 2 Com-
mentators may assert that this case law is reason to expect more caution
than the authors exhibit in presenting their analysis and conclusions.
The majority of these cases, however, should be distinguished on the
grounds that they deal with situations in which courts were presented
with excessively oppressive restraints imposed in the absence of any
meaningful collective bargaining.33 The authors' care in hypothesizing
a well-balanced restraint derived from good faith bargaining is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from this case law to justify the approach sug-
gested in the text.
The fact that the labor exemption is available in the sports context
may be of little comfort to management if the player restraints or other
practices having market effect are not part of the collective bargaining
agreement,3 4 This is especially important because present case law in-
dicates that the mere fact that management brings up the topic for bar-
gaining does not automatically grant immunity to that particular
practice. The cases appear to require more.35 Courts are likely to ap-
ply the labor exemption only to agreements resulting from good faith,
give-and-take collective bargaining where both parties have shaped the
content of the player restraint in question.
This last point serves to underscore one of the two major effects of
the labor exemption on professional sports. The labor exemption has
produced a shift in bargaining power. As sports franchise owners have
consistently contended, owners need some type of player restraint in
order to provide a marketable product. Assuming this assertion is cor-
rect, and given the antitrust difficulties of these restraints, the owners
have recently been willing to concede certain other benefits to the play-
ers in order to fall under the labor exemption umbrella. Thus, the bar-
31. Id. § 5.05, at 557-58.
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modfed, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modfed, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Philadel-
phia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972). See also THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.06a.
33. Id. § 5.06, at 588.




gaining position of the players has been substantially improved.
The second effect is the lessening of antitrust problems for the
owners of sports franchises. Owners do not need to be concerned
whether player restraint systems will pass antitrust scrutiny if they can
successfully invoke the labor exemption. This does not imply that
owners should not expect to see themselves engaged in litigation on
antitrust matters. The labor law exemption has not yet had a clear ju-
dicial review. Also, other antitrust issues remain unresolved in the pro-
fessional sports area. Yet to the extent that the labor exemption has
been acknowledged and accepted in the sports field by both union and
management, and given the relatively large volume of past litigation in
this area, it is likely that there will be less sport antitrust litigation in the
future.
2. Player Restraints Without the Labor Exemption. If the labor
law exemption is, for whatever reason, not available to the player re-
straint practices, then the issue becomes whether such restraints are in-
consistent with violations of federal antitrust laws.36 The litigation on
these issues in the 1970s has been extensive.
Certainly there can be no argument that the initial consideration
in this area remains whether the per se approach or rule of reason anal-
ysis in antitrust cases should control. At first blush many of the player
restraint practices fall under the traditional per se violation of the anti-
trust laws. For example, draft or reserve clauses can be characterized
as a group boycott or price fixing. Both of these practices have tradi-
tionally run afoul of antitrust laws under the per se approach.
37
Analysis of this antitrust issue, like the analysis of the scope of the
labor exemption, is hampered by uncertain doctrinal guidelines and the
unique economic setting of sports leagues. While the per se rule has
been a mainstay of antitrust jurisprudence, cracks in the doctrine ap-
pear to have been made by recent Supreme Court cases that allow for
speculation as to the doctrine's applicability in the sports context. In
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange38 the Court recognized that under
certain exceptional conditions there may be a "justification derived
from the policy of another statute or otherwise" to allow what would be
36. Id. § 5.07, at 591.
37. The four most common violations of the per se rules are price fixing, divisions of markets
between competitors, tying arrangements, and group boycotts. See, e.g., United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940). See also THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07, at 593-94 & nn. 653-56.
38. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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a per se violation under other circumstances.39 Consequently, sports
leagues have contended that the unique setting of the sports industry,
requiring economic cooperation to provide a product, justifies the
group boycott or price-fixing aspects of player restraint practices.
Considerable confusion exists in the decided cases whether the per
se rule or rule of reason approach is warranted. Decisions can be
found supporting both positions.4° From some of these cases it is ap-
parent that the Supreme Court was correct when it concluded that
"courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems."'4 ' Compounding the problem is the fact that some courts
have had a difficult time even comprehending the applicable antitrust
doctrines in the unique economic setting of professional sports.42
The authors conclude, as have some courts,43 that the special eco-
nomic circumstances in sports leagues warrant a closer look at the par-
ticular player restraints than provided by the per se approach. A recent
Supreme Court case,44 decided after the publication of The Law of
Sports, supports the authors' conclusion. According to the Court, the
characteristics of a particular industry may legitimize activities tradi-
tionally labeled per se violations.45 The authors suggest an approach
that utilizes the rule of reason test yet retains the per se approach. They
recognize that the per se approach, which eases the litigation burden of
39. Id. at 348-49.
40. See cases cited in THE LAW OF SPoRTs § 5.07b-c.
41. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
42. THE LAW OF SPORTs § 5.07, at 617-18.
43. Id. § 5.07d; see, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
44. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1551 (1979).
45. In Broadcast Music€ the Supreme Court was squarely faced with allegations of price
fixing in the field of blanket licenses for copyrighted musical compositions. Organizations set up
by copyright owners were used as clearinghouses to sell blanket licenses to users of such copy-
righted material. The Court noted that to characterize particular conduct under the per se rule,
the courts must determine if
the purpose of the practice is to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free
market economy--that is, whether the practice facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output, and in what
portion of the market, or instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and
render markets more rather than less competitive."
Id. at 1562 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
In Broadcast Music the Court found that the unique area of copyrighted material necessitated
blanket licensing arrangements and such arrangements were not merely a "naked [restraint] of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." Id. at 1562 (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). In short, the Court found a need in this particular
industry for such price-fixing arrangements and thus held that this activity was not merely to
curtail competition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
determine whether the blanket licensing arrangement as employed by the clearinghouses was un-
lawful under a rule of reason inquiry. See also Hayes v. National Football League, 469 F. Supp.
247 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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plaintiffs and creates clear categories of prohibited action, can be bene-
ficial in the sports context. Accordingly, the authors suggest that the
courts utilize the rule of reason approach until there are enough deci-
sions delineating a pattern of common characteristics in player restraint,
practices that are clear violations of antitrust laws. Thereafter, when a
player restraint action is brought, it can proceed under the per se ap-
proach if the case falls within a category of restraints that have been
found to be clear violations. Further, a "factual inquiry" would be al-
lowed in these per se cases to decide if the particular league does have a
"truly extraordinary" need for such a practice.46
At first blush this proposal has appeal. It permits courts to recog-
nize that the economic behavior of the sports industry is different than
the general economic model of the free enterprise system. Further-
more, it attempts to develop gradually guidelines in the antitrust area
for the sports industry to follow. Nevertheless, the practicality and via-
bility of such an approach is questionable.
It is doubtful that such a body of law can be developed within a
reasonable period of time. Given the different federal circuits, the nu-
merous sports leagues, the different player restraint systems, and the
unlikely event that many of these cases will reach the Supreme Court, it
could be decades before a per se line of cases would develop in this
area. It is important to realize that the per se approach as it now exists
developed over several decades and is still in need of considerable re-
finement. Further, it may not be sound policy for professional sports
leagues to be subject to a different antitrust approach than other market
systems. Other market systems with unique characteristics might also
demand a body of law peculiarly their own. A final and perhaps more
compelling argument against the suggested approach is that present an-
titrust doctrines may provide a partial solution for dealing with the pe-
culiar economic setting of the sports industry.
It can be argued that applying the per se rules developed in more
traditional contexts to the sports industry is economically naive. Sports
leagues simply do not operate under a free market system; they have
special problems dictated by the need for balance in competition.
However, to develop a whole new set of per se rules would take too
much time. The use of the rule of reason also presents drawbacks: it
places a great burden on plaintiffs to develop their cases and forces the
courts to make difficult economic judgments. Perhaps a modified ap-
proach, modeled after the one the Supreme Court suggested in Silver,
46. THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07, at 621.
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would better alleviate these varied concerns.47 Under Silver, the case
for plaintiff could be made under the traditional per se approach. De-
fendant would then be allowed to present a defense that the particular
nature of the market system dictates that such a practice be used.
Under such a system, plaintiffs would not be burdened, at least ini-
tially, with having to develop their case. The court's burden would be
similarly lessened since the decision would shift to whether the particu-
lar practice, which is presumptively deemed improper, could be justi-
fied given the unique market conditions. This approach seems more
practical than that put forth by the authors while at the same time ame-
liorating some of the concerns in the area.
Perhaps the most ironic point about the per se rule/rule of reason
debate is that in the decided cases, the choice of approach has not af-
fected the outcome: under both standards the courts have found the
player restraint practices violative of antitrust principles.48 Neverthe-
less, the authors argue for some type of player restraint, at least until it
can be empirically demonstrated that, despite the uniqueness of the
sports industry, player restraints are unnecessary.49 This position is
supported by case law suggesting that some type of player restraint may
be necessary in the sports industry. Exactly what type of player re-
straints are proper remains subject to debate. The authors correctly
note that there are at least three concerns that decided cases have fo-
cused on: whether the restraint is perpetual in nature; the amount of
discretion given to the management under the player restraint practice;
and the need for competitive balance within a leagueA0
C. Other Sports Antitrust Problem Areas
Player restraints are not the only area of possible antitrust
problems for sports leagues. A number of related provisions affecting
demand for player services may also be subject to antitrust scrutiny.5'
Generally, these provisions deal with such aspects as player eligibility,
game standards, and discipline of players. Additionally, more complex
antitrust issues exist in the area of ownership and location of sports
franchises.5 2 These issues are extensively analyzed in The Law of
Sports. Generally, the antitrust concerns in these areas have been less
47. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1551 (1979); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
48. THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07c, e.
49. Id. § 5.07, at 625, 629.
50. Id. § 5.07, at 625-27.
51. Id. §§ 5.08-. 10.
52. Id. § 5.11.
1226 [Vol. 1979:1215
BOOK .REVIEW 122
prevalent in sports litigation and legal literature than those antitrust
issues previously discussed. Nevertheless, this pattern may reverse in
the future, especially in the area of ownership and location of sports
franchises.
III. CONCLUSION
Antitrust laws have had a major influence on the format of profes-
sional sports leagues in the 1970s and on the economic relationship be-
tween players and owners. The resolution of presently unresolved
antitrust issues will no doubt continue to affect these matters substan-
tially in the 1980s.
"The crest of the future of baseball," said Joe Garagiola, Jr., "will
be ridden by lawyers." 53 For those of us who used to watch Willie
Mays defy the impossible, that statement may be rather discomforting.
Yet the realities of the sports field suggest that the statement is proba-
bly correct for all sports. The Law of Sports provides a valuable tool
with which those riding on that crest may provide a better quality legal
product.
53. National Law Journal, Jan. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
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